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RESUMO: O  presente artigo oferece uma explicação para aquela que talvez seja a 
tese mais estranha e menos intuitiva de Wittgenstein – a tese da mutação semântica – 
segundo a qual nunca se consegue responder a uma conjectura matemática porque a 
nova prova altera os próprios significados dos termos envolvidos na pergunta original. 
Ao invés de basearmos nossa justificação na distinção entre mero cálculo e 
demonstrações de proposições isoladas, característica do período intermediário, nós a 
generalizamos de forma a incluir procedimentos efetivos de cálculo também. 
 
ABSTRACT: The present article offers an explanation of perhaps Wittgenstein’s 
strangest and least intuitive thesis – the semantical mutation thesis – according to which 
one can never answer a mathematical conjecture because the new proof alters the very 
meanings of the terms involved in the original question. Instead of basing our 
justification on the distinction between mere calculation and proofs of isolated 
propositions, characteristic of Wittgenstein’s intermediary period, we generalize it to 
include conjectures involving effective procedures as well. 
 
 
Some of Wittgenstein’s remarks on the philosophy of 
mathematics are notoriously extravagant, even hostile. Consider, say, 
his famous comment on “‘the disastrous invasion’ of mathematics by 
logic” (Wittgenstein, 1983, p. 281).1 None perhaps seems so unintuitive, 
downright outrageous as the Semantical mutation Thesis, though. By 
Semantical Mutation Thesis we mean Wittgenstein’s strange idea that 
no mathematician could ever settle any mathematical conjectures 
because, according to him, all novel proofs strictly speaking alter the 
very concepts in terms of which the original conjectures were framed. 
In other words, mathematical advances are always answers to different 
                                            
1 This paper is part of the second chapter of a book I’m writing on Wittgenstein’s Philosophy of 
Mathematics. 
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questions than their original motivating conjectures. Again according 
to Wittgenstein there will always be a “semantical gap” between 
conjectures and the rule they engender. One can never “level up” the 
two groups; a new mathematical advance always represents a conceptual 
modification. Thus the name we’ve proposed to this idea. 
There is no doubt that Wittgenstein did maintain these eccentric 
ideas in his so-called middle period: 
 
… once a proof has been supplied, it in no way proves what 
had been conjectured, … you can’t conjecture the proof until 
you’ve got it, and not then, either. (Wittgenstein, 2005, pp. 
418-9) 
 
Why do I say that we don’t “discover” a proposition like the 
fundamental theorem of algebra, but instead “construct” it? – 
Because in proving it we give it a new sense that it didn’t have 
before. (Wittgenstein, 2005, p. 428)  
 
The “medical proof ” didn’t incorporate the hypothesis it 
proved into a new calculus, and so didn’t give it a new sense; a 
mathematical proof incorporates the mathematical 
proposition into a new calculus, and alters its position in 
mathematics. (Wittgenstein, 2005, p. 426) 
 
There is less agreement whether Wittgenstein did continue to support 
these ideas in his latter, mature years. Apparently, the majority of the 
authors (Wright, 1980, p. Chp 3; Shanker, 1987, p. Chp 3; Diamond, 
1991, p. Chp 10; Glock, 1996) (Marion & Okada, 2012; Schroeder, 
2012; Säätelä, 2011) are “continuists”. For them Wittgenstein never 
changed his mind about these odd opinions. But there is a smaller 
group which suggests quite the opposite: 
 
The calculus conception [from the middle period] was unable 
to account for the change and growth of mathematics, while 
the language-game conception [from the latter period] 
emphasizes this. The bizarre views [on semantical mutation]     
that have earned many commentators' derision drop out. 
(Gerrard, 1991, p. 132) 2 
                                            
2 See also (Frascolla, 2004, pp. 180-1; Panjvani, 2006, pp. 420-1). I thank Severin Schroeder for 
indicating me some of these earlier sources. 
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For an exegete trying to make sense of Wittgenstein’s ideas, it might 
look as a gain to classify the semantical mutation thesis as a “temporary 
speculation” within “transitory period” of the philosopher’s 
development. One would still have to explain the source of these 
strange ideas – perhaps referring to this period’s stringent 
verificationism – but one would be relieved of any further need of 
justifying this seemingly outrageous proposal. Unfortunately the latter 
textual evidence does not seem to bear this out. In Wittgenstein’s 
Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics one reads: 
 
Now how about this – ought I to say that the same sense can 
only have one proof? Or that when a proof is found the sense 
alters? 
Of course some people would oppose this and say: "Then the 
proof of a proposition cannot ever be found, for, if it has 
been found, it is no longer the proof of this proposition". 
(Wittgenstein, 1983, p. 366) 
 
When I said that a proof introduces a new concept, I meant 
something like: the proof puts a new paradigm among the 
paradigms of the language …One would like to say: the proof 
changes the grammar of our language, changes our concepts. 
(Wittgenstein, 1983, p. 166) 
 
I should like to say: the proof shows me a new connection, 
and hence it also gives me a new concept. (Wittgenstein, 1983, 
p. 297) 
 
The early dismissal of the semantical mutation thesis as a “temporary 
fling” doesn’t appear to be really available. Thus, the only option left 
open for the exegete would be to squarely face the challenge of making 
sense of the horrible idea. The task appears daunting, though. Consider 
the recent discussion on the foundations of mathematics. One finds 
various proposals for alternative foundations of mathematical 
knowledge, besides the classical set theoretical one. There are the new 
categorical foundations, various type-theoretic versions, the 
intuitionistic reconstructions, even the ultra-finitists. Despite such 
diversity, there is one point about which all of them seem to agree: the 
precept that a mathematician is basically a proof-producer. It is 
André Porto 
 
 
47                            
 
precisely this last common ground, perhaps the only common ground 
shared by all participants of the debate that Wittgenstein’s proposal 
appears to threaten.  
 Of course, we could insist that Wittgenstein is not discarding 
the notion of proof. He is just altering the way we construe the 
connection between a conjecture and its settling proof. But 
Wittgenstein’s proposal seems to undermine the idea that no proof can 
“come out of the blue”. Any new proof was already sort of “potentially 
there”, “prefigured in the very meanings of the mathematical concepts 
involved”. A conjecture-settler (say, Andrew Wiles on Fermat’s last 
theorem) doesn’t downright invent his proof. The elements he needed 
for his achievement were “already there”, somehow dormant in some 
theory (apparently called “the Theory of Elliptic Curves”). No one 
realized just how that could be done. He was the first to discover a way 
to do it, thus his claim to glory. All of this is constitutive of the very 
self-image of the mathematician, his sense of worth, his pride. 
 If the proof of a conjecture is never an answer to the question 
which preceded it, if each new proof is merely a semantical mutation 
which does not come out of any preexisting system which potentially 
prompts it, then new mathematical advances would appear arbitrary. 
The whole of mathematics would loose its necessary character. Is this 
what Wittgenstein is proposing? Of course once again our entire 
problem here is just how to characterize the notion of a system 
determining its inferential consequences. Just as in the example of the 
uncalculated decimal place of Pi (Porto, 2013, p. 83)3, Wile’s settling of 
Fermat’s conjecture seemed “already somehow determined by a 
preceding system”. Paraphrasing Wittgenstein’s famous remark, it’s as if 
the system “ran ahead of us and fixed all its future logical consequences 
much before any actual mathematician ever realized that opportunity”. 
We are clearly back to where we’ve started, the crucial question within 
the rule-following considerations: exactly how does a function 
determine its extension, how does a program prefigure its execution 
and, a system predetermine its “logical consequences”? What should we 
                                            
3 Any one beyond the 5,000,000,000,001st, according to 2010’s attempt. 
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say about this “forward abstract inferential potency”, this anticipated 
fixation of all possible mathematical advances? 
 
 
Wittgenstein’s pet example of a “Conjecture Settling” 
 
In 1: 7 gibt es ein endliches Problem und ein unendliches. 
(Wittgenstein, 1979, p. 183) 
 
Let us return to Wittgenstein’s texts. To be sure, even the 
hardheaded philosopher has to accept, “at least a sociological fact”, the 
“phenomenon of conjecture”. Mathematicians do seem to answer some 
old mathematical challenges, even centenary ones, like in Wile’s case. 
Even stubborn Wittgenstein cannot but accept that:  
 
Sometimes it seems as though mathematical discoveries are 
made by performing what one might call a mathematical 
experiment. For example, the mathematician first notices a 
certain regularity and then proves that it had to be so. 
(Wittgenstein, 1976, p. 92)  
 
Yes: Wittgenstein himself concedes that “sometimes it seems as though” 
mathematical conjectures do occur. How could he deny that? One 
notices an apparent regularity and then demonstrates that that 
regularity was not accidental at all: it had to happen. The philosopher 
even has a sort of “pet example” of such phenomenon, the “discovery 
of the period” in a division such as 1 ÷ 3 or 1 ÷ 7:  
 
Suppose a person divides 1 by 3 to see whether 4 turns up in 
the development. I tell him "You will never get 4; it is 
hopeless", and draw his attention to the fact that the dividend 
and remainder are the same. This may never have struck him. 
Here it looks as though by drawing attention to this fact we 
did not perform an operation but showed what was already 
there. It also looks as though this is a quick way of showing 
what could be shown by carrying on the division to an 
enormous number of places and concluding that it is hopeless 
to look for a 4.The use of the rule to show by a short cut that 
a 4 cannot be found looks very much like giving up looking 
for a pine tree on being told that pines never grow in the soil 
of that neighborhood. (WITTGENSTEIN, 1979, p. 182) 
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To begin our discussion, there is an important point which deserves to 
be stressed here: his choice of example. In contemporary terms, it 
involves regularities of an effectively computable operation, a recursive 
function (the division 1 ÷ 3). There is surprisingly little discussion in 
the secondary literature on Wittgenstein’s rather extensive discussions 
of these recursive processes, the periodic divisions.4 Perhaps the usual 
accusation of a lack of mathematical sophistication by the philosopher 
is at work here.5  
Be that as it may, the first thing we would like to stress about 
Wittgenstein’s example is the fact that his rather humble question 
(whether the number 4 will ever turn up in the development of the 
quotient 1 ÷ 3 ) is carefully chosen to concern mathematical object 
about which all the participants of the foundational debate on 
mathematics, be they classicists, intuitionists, finitists or even ultra-
finitists, recognize as a genuine mathematical object. Wittgenstein’s 
choice of “conjecture” is anything but unsophisticated. Intuitionists 
sometimes discard the very meaningfulness of some classical 
mathematical statements and construals. In consonance with that, some 
classical mathematical conjectures (say, about inaccessible cardinals) are 
rejected as pseudo-questions by the intuitionists and even more so by 
the finitists and ultra-finitists. But the legitimacy of the object in 
question – a non-exponential recursive process – cannot be questioned, 
even by an ultra-finitist. The acceptability of Wittgenstein petty 
conjecture is beyond dispute, even from the point of view of these 
more “wild” alternatives. His example lays within the (rather narrow) 
area about which all parties in the foundational debate are in 
agreement. It’s about the very hard core of mathematics. 
 There is also another important aspect of Wittgenstein’s 
somewhat unassuming pet example which should be pointed out here. 
His “conjecture” – whether the reappearance of 3’s was accidental, or 
whether one could ever obtain a different number, say, a 4 in the 
quotient’s expansion – is strikingly reminiscent of a most illustrious 
                                            
4 (Wittgenstein, 1975, pp. 223-34), (Wittgenstein, 2005, pp. 466-7), (Wittgenstein, 1979, pp. 
183-6) and (Wittgenstein, 1976, pp. 122-30) 
5 Cf (Bernays, 1986, p. 173; Mac Lane, 1986, p. 444; Putnam, 2007, p. 246) 
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problem in Classical Computability Theory: the famous Halting 
Question. All we would have to do to transmute his conjecture into the 
halting question would be to shift one’s attention from the quotient 
expansion to that of the remainder’s expansion and ask: does a number 
0 ever turns up in that other expansion? Once again one can gage the 
centrality of Wittgenstein’s investigation: his choice aims at the very 
heart of the foundational debate: the notions of effective procedure, of 
infinity and that of computability. 
 
 
What are those conjectures about? 
 
Let us commence our effort to live up to our discouraging task: 
making sense of Wittgenstein’s preposterous-looking thesis of 
semantical mutation within the very constrictive arena of effective 
computable functions. We have an operation, the unpretentious 
division 1 ÷ 3 and we have a “conjecture”: whether there will ever be a 
4 in the quotient’s expansion 0,333 …. We notice that this is true for 
the initial decimals, and we make an hypothesis: this will always be like 
that, only 3’s will ever turn up in that expansion, it is hopeless to look 
for a 4. Later, so the tale goes, we “settle our conjecture”: we discover 
that that division is periodic and the period – a single digit “3” – does 
not include 4 (such as it happens, say, in the cycle of 1 ÷ 7).  
Our hopeless-looking task, the task confronting any 
Wittgenstein’s wholehearted devotee, would (unfortunately) be: to 
explain just how “the master” intends to argue in favor of a “semantical 
mutation” in such direct and transparent cases. What semantical 
mutation could Wittgenstein be talking about there? What possible 
conceptual change could have ever taken place in the diminutive 
transition from the “conjecture” (“Will there ever be a 4 ?”) to its 
“settling” (“It’s periodic, There won’t be any 4’s!”). Just what concept (if 
any) suffered that so-called “semantical mutation” and what exactly was 
that mutation?  
As we pointed out before, our conjecture has almost the same 
logical structure as a most distinguished question, the Halting question. 
If Wittgenstein’s example would have been just slightly different, we 
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would have in front of us precisely a very clear cut instantiation of the 
famous question about the infinity or finiteness of that very process. In 
other words, Wittgenstein’s (and the devotee’s) challenge will be to 
somehow show us that even the “halting settling” fails to answer the 
“halting conjecture”: not a very promising task indeed. 
We will have to move on by steps, one at a time. We are still not 
ready to meet our “main challenge” yet. As our first move toward that 
goal though, we have to begin by pointing out a difference in the way a 
classicist and an intuitionist construe those questions (the occurrence 
of 4’s and the halting question). The difference concerns the nominal 
part of that “conjecture”: what are we conjecturing about? The classical 
and intuitionistic construals diverge. For the classicist we are talking, of 
course, about an extension, a set of order pairs, along the lines of, say: 
 
{(𝑛, 𝑞𝑛) ∶ (1 ÷ 3)(𝑛) =  𝑞𝑛}6 
 
or expressed in characteristically extensional notation: 
 
{(0, 0), (1, 3), (2, 3), (3, 3), … } 
 
All reference to the original generating process, the operation 
involved, is dropped in the classical proposal. In its place we are offered 
a strange postulation: the idea of a “final complete list of all partial 
answers” thoroughly independent of any epistemological act, a pure 
“record of a complete final execution of that operation” (an operation 
not operated by any one at no particular time). It is about that “pure 
list” that those conjectures are construed on, according to the classicist. 
In our example, the question regarding the occurrence of a 4 in the 
quotient’s expansion would be construed as simply the appearance of 
that digit as the second component of some ordered pair within that 
list. No reference to a process, just pure “platonic actuality”. 
Intuitionists notoriously rejects such complete discarding of the 
operational component. For them, the list of partial answers is 
secondary, the operation, primary. In fact, as we all know, that “list” 
                                            
6 “𝑞𝑛” being of course the 𝑛
th decimal place of the quotient’s development. 
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will end up being “infinite” (the “list” of partial results of the 
operation 1 ÷ 3). What would then be the point of talking about a 
“list” involving infinite entries, complains intuitionists? How could we 
ever list all partial answers in such extreme cases? In a typical 
intuitionist’s reaction to those classical proposals, Dummett writes: 
 
… to grasp an infinite structure is to grasp the process which 
generates it, to refer to such a structure is to refer to that 
process, and to recognize the structure as being infinite is to 
recognize that the process will not terminate. (Dummett, 1977, 
p. 56)7 
 
For an intuitionist, in all such cases (as in our “conjectures”) we are not 
talking, or conjecturing, about extensional objects, these strange “lists 
of correct partial answers”. We are referring to “methods of 
obtainment”, in our example, the method of obtaining, say, the third 
part of 1 written in decimal notation. Thus, instead of an extensional 
object, the classical notion of set: 
 
{(𝑛, 𝑞𝑛) ∶ (1 ÷ 3)(𝑛) =  𝑞𝑛} 
 
for a intuitionist our conjectures should be construed as 
referring to an intentional object, something which could be expressed 
in the lambda-notion as: 
[𝜆𝑛 ∶ ℕ .  (1 ÷ 3)(𝑛)] 
 
Another way to make a similar point would be to recall that 
intuitionists do have some notion of totality which is reminiscent of 
the classical notion of set. One can think of Brouwer’s Species (Van 
Heijenoort, 1967, p. 448) or, more contemporarily, Bishop’s and 
Martin-Löf’s Sets (Bishop, 1986, p. 410; Martin-Löf, 1984, p. 5). But 
these are much weaker than the classical Sets. Fundamentally 
intuitionism rejects the classical way of forming a totality via the 
Axiom of Comprehension, i.e., as the extension of a property, any 
                                            
7 One could call this the ordinal construal of infinity, as opposed to the classical cardinal one. 
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property.8 Thus, only some of classical totalities are also sets, say, in 
Martin-Löf’s sense, but hot all of them. According to that author, a 
classical totality could only be called a Set (or a Domain) if one could 
offer exhaustive rules for forming its objects, the “canonical objects” 
and for deciding “when two noncanonical elements are equal”. (Martin-
Löf, 1984, p. 5). We are back to the requirement of a “method of 
construction” again, not only regarding the construction of the objects 
themselves, but also regarding their discrimination. 
One last point should be stressed here, before we move on. This 
time, our observation is not going to be about something on which 
classicists and intuitionists diverge. Quite the contrary, it is a point 
about which they are all in fact in perfect agreement: the abstract 
nature of mathematical objects. Whether intensionally or extensionally 
construed, the occupants of the nominal part of our conjectures 
 
𝐻𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑠?
(           )
             
𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑠?
(              )
             
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑠 𝑎 4?
(                     )
 
 
are always abstract entities. Both intuitionists and classicists agree that 
we are not framing these “conjectures” directly about ordinary 
empirical processes, i.e., specific implementations executed by some 
calculating agent at a particular occasion (and the partial answers that 
agent ends up obtaining). Our problems are mathematical conjectures, 
not empirical hypothesis. So according to them these conjectures are 
not about concrete implementations, but about abstractly conceived 
objects (be they intensional or extensionally construed). 
This is important because as we will see even though 
Wittgenstein agrees with both parties that the distinction between 
empirical propositions and mathematical assertions – his rules – is 
crucial, for him the appeal to abstract entities as a way of construing 
such distinction is completely misguided. It is not enough to merely 
restrict the abstract operation of forming totalities, say, by requiring 
both a method of construal and a method of discrimination, as 
                                            
8 Of course, even the classicist has to agree that an unrestricted appeal to this abstraction-
operation would lead to Russell’s paradox. Zermelo’s Separation Axiom Schema can be seen as 
a form of restriction on that operation, even within the classical camp. 
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intuitionists insist, as the intuitionist proposes. The very idea of an 
(abstract) object, or of an abstract operation, be it intensionally or 
extensionally construed, is still the result of confusion between 
empirical propositions and mathematical rules according to them. We 
will have to come back to this crucial point latter, of course. 
 
 
Methods as Programs: nothing has changed! 
 
Let us go back to our illustrative conjectures about the division 
1 ÷ 3 and let us adopt for a while the more demanding intuitionist 
construal of such questions (the intuitionist’s insistence on methods is 
certainly comprehensible to a classicist, he only believes it might be 
dropped as inessential in the end). Our question will then be: exactly 
how should we construe the intuitionistic notion of method, of 
operation, then? In other words, what kinds of entities should we take 
lambda terms such as 
 
[𝜆𝑛 ∶ ℕ .  (1 ÷ 3)(𝑛)] 
 
to be referring to? How should we construe the very idea of a 
method of obtainment?  
One direct answer to this question is given by Martin-Löf 
himself: 
 
Think of (𝜆𝑥) 𝑏(𝑥) as a name of the program 𝑏(𝑥). (Martin-
Löf, 1984, p. 29) 
 
The suggestion is thus to construe the rather abstract-looking 
lambda-terms very concretely, as computer programs. One must agree 
this is indeed a very natural proposal indeed. A program can be seen as 
description of an operation, its definition. More then that: differently 
from a simple description, one can even “run it”, so we can check if it’s 
correctly constructed, if everything is alright, no missteps involved).  
So, according to that proposal, when one conjectures about such 
properties as “Halts?” or “Contains a 4?”, one would be talking about 
programs, the “embodied definitions of those operations”. In the 
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context of our illustrative case we could even illustrate this with 
something like the pseudo-code: 
 
{ 
int divisor, dividend, quo, rem; 
dividend = 1; 
divisor = 3; 
quo = dividend ÷ divisor; 
rem = dividend – (quo × divisor); 
print (quo); 
while (rem ≠ 0) 
 { 
 quo = (10 × rem) ÷ divisor; 
 rem = (10 × rem) – (quo × divisor); 
 print (quo); 
 } 
} 
 
So, if we accept such proposed identification of intuitionist’s 
methods obtainment with computer programs, our “conjectures” would 
be very concretely construed to be about programs. Our questions 
would thus be framed concerning them. Let us take, say, our question 
about the appearance of the digit 4. What we would really be asking, 
according to this proposal, would be the (apparently) very reasonable 
question: will we ever get such and such digits as the output of our 
program? Similarly with our “halting question”.  
To recapitulate all that we have obtained so far, here we have a 
very clear-cut version of the exegete’s challenge of making some sense 
out of Wittgenstein’s Semantical mutation Thesis. We do frame 
mathematical conjectures, and in the case of recursive operations the 
meanings of these conjectures could be very concretely construed as 
being about programs and their implementations, so even the fussy 
intuitionists would have to accept that. What we are asking would then 
concern the behavior of machines while running these programs.  
But now here, within this very concrete context, Wittgenstein’s 
insistence of some sort of “semantical mutation” appears to be 
completely absurd! The program’s text remains exactly the same, before 
and after we “settled our conjectures”. Nothing’s changed. We merely 
discover some new properties about that particular operation: it is 
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cyclic, and thus, infinite (and the digit 4 is not part of the quotient’s 
cycle). That is all. No “conceptual change”, no “new meaning”, 
nothing! We merely uncovered some new attributes (recurrence, non-
halting) of one and the same operation, the same program. 
Wittgenstein seems to be wrong. In fact, the situation is even worse 
then that. His proposal seems to be utterly absurd! What could he be 
thinking when he intimated some sort of “conceptual mutation” here? 
What mysterious “conceptual change” could have taken place, aside 
from our own mathematical improvement? 
 
 
What is an Effective Procedure? The intuitionistic stance 
 
In the beginning of last section we’ve agreed on identifying 
intuitionist’s lambda-terms such as 
 
[𝜆𝑛 ∶ ℕ .  (1 ÷ 3)(𝑛)] 
 
with programs. But, was that a good idea? Should we have 
accepted identifying intuitionist’s methods of obtainment directly with 
programs? From a purely extensional point of view one could readily 
accept that there is no crucial difference between a program and a 
method, but should that also be the case when we regard the situation 
from an intensional point of view? Should the notion of method (or 
the notion of algorithm, for that matter) be identified with the notion 
of program? 
We would like to begin our discussion by stressing the fact that 
any investigation of the idea of identifying operations and programs 
will end up including also an evaluation of Church’s (or Turing’s) 
thesis. The reason is immediate: any such proposals (Church’s, 
Turing’s) is bound to include some sort of identification of intensional 
notions (such as operations, effective procedures, methods of 
obtainment) with some formal counterparts, i.e., documents written in 
some specially chosen formal language. Thus, in Church’s case the 
selected language would be his own lambda notation. In Turing’s case 
we would have of course his famous Turing Machines. If we move on 
to a more recent proposal, Yury Gurevich’s for example, despite all his 
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rather more general and abstract approach, we still find a crucial 
identification of an algorithm with texts written in a specific formal 
language, in his case an algebraic fragment of first order languages. 
(Gurevich & Deschowitz, 2008, p. 314)9 
In all such proposals one finds an essential identification of 
typically intensional notions, such as an operation, with some specific 
formal texts written in some higher or lower level programing 
languages. This identification is going to be rejected by Wittgenstein. 
He is going to reject any identification of rules and (formal) texts. But 
before we examine his ideas, it might be useful to quickly recall that 
full-blooded intuitionists also tend to reject Church’s Thesis.  
Differently from Wittgenstein, their difficulty is connected to 
the very idea of defining constructivity. The notion of method of 
obtainment should be final, absolute, primitive. All classical attempts 
of defining the notion of computable function involve the idea of an 
extensional equivalence. But this notion is not available to an 
intuitionist, of course. The equivalence between ordinary arguments 
and formal proofs within some system could not be extensionally 
construed. One could not simply offer a general ∀∃ formulation, for 
all ordinary mathematical operations, there is, say, a Turing machine 
such that… The existential quantifier would have to be intuitionistically 
understood. One would have to actually exhibit some such method. 
Thus, Prawitz writes: 
 
It seems that the notion of constructive procedure used here 
must be taken as a primitive notion. … it is not possible to 
define it as a Turing machine that yields the value when 
applied to an argument; the ∀∃ in this definition must then 
be understood intuitionistically, (Prawitz, 1977, p. 27). 10 
 
And here again there is a rather subtle question involved: the notion 
existence of a method will have to be further distinguish from the 
notion of objectual existence, the notion of existence expressed by the 
intuitionistic existential quantifier. The idea of existence of a method 
                                            
9 I thank Kim Solin for calling my attention to Gurevich’s work. 
10 Apparently this argument was first introduced by (Peter, 1959). It is also found in (Skolem, 
1952, p. 123) and in (Prawitz, 1977, p. 27) 
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will have to be concretely construed, in cannot be a mere in principle, 
theoretical possibility of construction as in the case of intuitionistic 
objectual existence. Objectual propositions of existence (such as 
“∃𝑥 ∶ 𝐷 (𝑃(𝑥))”) are explained by intuitionists as the possession of a 
demonstration which assures us that 𝑃(𝑎) is true for some inhabitant 
𝑎 in 𝐷. But the general idea of demonstration (as opposed to that  of a 
canonical proof) is further explain as the possession of a method for 
producing a canonical proof of that proposition.  
On pain of vicious regress (or circularity), one cannot go back 
and explain the notion of existence of a method appealing once again 
to the idea of objectual, existentially quantified propositions. Thus 
Prawitz writes: 
 
One may ask whether this knowledge [of a method or a 
procedure] should not consist of a description of the 
procedure together with a proof that this procedure has the 
property required… But this would lead to an infinite regress… 
(Prawitz, 1977, p. 27) 
 
Existence of method, of a constructive procedure, cannot involve any 
appeal to a further demonstration, as in the case of the intuitionistic 
interpretation of an existential quantifier. It has to be final. For the 
idea of demonstration itself is to be explained in terms of method of 
obtainment, and not vice versa. 
 
Intuitionistically, truth of a proposition is analyzed as 
existence of proof… It is quite clear that the notion of 
existence that enters here is not the notion of existence that is 
expressed by means of the existential quantifier. (Martin-Löf, 
1991, p. 141) 
 
We are back to the idea of actually exhibiting some such method of 
translating “all possible ordinary (intuitionistic) proofs” into some 
specified formal system. But, so complains the intuitionist, is it 
reasonable to even talk about “the totality of all past, present, future 
intuitionistic proofs”? Would such predicate really circumscribe an 
intuitionistically acceptable totality? And further on: does it make sense 
to expect a translation method from the pseudo-totality of all 
André Porto 
 
 
59                            
 
intuitionistically acceptable demonstrations into a specific formal 
system? Dummett writes: 
 
As for Church's Thesis, this is not particularly plausible from 
an intuitionistic standpoint. … (Dummett, 1977, p. 264) 
 
This thesis [a mathematical proof or construction is essentially 
a mental entity] is rejection of the idea that there can even be 
an isomorphism between the totality of possible proofs of 
statements within some mathematical theory and any 
determinately specified totality of symbolic structures, i.e. 
proofs within any formal system. (Dummett, 1978, p. 200) 
 
Differently from a classicist, an intuitionist cannot even accept the idea 
of a true absolutely undecidable proposition.  
An intuitionist like him not only rejects any reference to a 
totality of all intuitionistically sound arguments, but he would also 
rejects as implausible the idea of a method of translation of all those 
arguments into any one given formal system.  
 
These notions [propositions and judgments] have later been 
replaced by the formalistic notions of formula and theorem 
(in a formal system), respectively. Contrary to formulas, 
propositions are not defined inductively. So to speak, they 
form an open concept. (Martin-Löf, 1984, p. 2) 
 
 
What is an Algorithm? 
 
As we’ve anticipated before, according to our reconstruction of 
Wittgenstein’s thought, the author of the Philosophical Investigations 
should definitively reject all proposals of identification of algorithms 
and programs. But his rejection has nothing to do with the 
interpretation of the existential quantifiers or the notion of totality. 
Rather his problem has to do with a key intensional element which is 
present both in the notions of method and of algorithm, and which is 
completely absent in the concept of program.  
An algorithm, as well as a method, are both teleological notions. 
They are both means to a desired end. The idea of a program is not. A 
program is just some (grammatically well-constructed) text. There is no 
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teleological component, no reference to a goal, no task to be fulfilled, 
just a general constraining criterion: grammaticality, well-formedness. 
Thus, there is here a sharp contrast with the notions of algorithm, of 
method. A method is always a method of attaining something. Likewise 
with the notion of algorithm: at least in its original version (before 
Kleene’s proposal of a new, enlarged notion of effective operation) 
something could properly be called an algorithm only in so far as it 
provided a strategy for solving some targeted question. This was the 
construal behind Hilbert’s famous Entscheidungsverfahren, a decision-
method for solving a given mathematical question (say, regarding the 
validity of logical formula): 
  
…a procedure that, for a given logical expression, allows one to 
decide the general validity or satisfiability through a finite 
number of operations. (Hilbert & Ackermann, 1928, p. 72) 
 
Kleene himself introduces the notion of algorithm also as a method of 
obtainment (of an answer): 
 
In mathematics, we are often interested in having a general 
method or procedure for answering anyone of a certain class 
of questions; for example, the class of questions, "Is n a prime 
number?".   
 
After the procedure has been described, if we select any 
question from the class, the procedure will then tell us how to 
perform successive steps, so that after a finite number of them 
we will have the answer to the question selected. … Such 
methods as I have just described have had a prominent role in 
mathematics. They have been called “algorithms”. (Kleene, 
1995, pp. 15,16)  
 
 
The emphasis lays entirely on the final obtainment of the intended 
answer: 
 
After our performing any step to which the procedure has led 
us, the rules or instructions will either enable us to recognize 
that now we have the answer before us and to read it off, or 
else that we do not yet have the answer before us… (Kleene, 
1995, p. 16) 
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Just as it was in the case of Hilbert’s Entscheidungsverfahren, for 
something to be called a “decision procedure” it should always be 
crowned by the final obtainment of the intended answer “after a finite 
number of operations”, as Hilbert said, or, in the words of Kleene: 
“after a finite number of [steps] we will have the answer to the question 
selected”. Thus, the original concept of an effective procedure involved 
just that: effectiveness, i.e., “the quality of being able to bring about the 
intended effect”, i.e., the answer.  
This is important because as we know it was Kleene himself who 
in 1938 proposed a new, enlarged concept of an effective procedure. 
Instead of concentrating on the goal, the answer, the focus was 
transferred to that of a formal (“grammatical well formed”) 
characterization of the “nature of the process and the set of [its] 
instructions”: 
 
An effective or constructive operation on the objects of an 
enumerable class is one for which a fixed set of instructions 
can be chosen such that, for each of the infinitely many 
objects (or n-tuples of objects), the operation can be completed 
by a finite process in accordance with the instructions. This 
notion is made exact by specifying the nature of the process 
and set of instructions. It appears possible to do so without 
loss of generality. … If we omit the requirement that the 
computation process always terminate, we obtain a more 
general class of functions, each function of which is defined 
over a subset (possibly null or total) of the n-tuples of natural 
numbers, and possesses the property of effectiveness when 
defined. These functions we call partial recursive. (Kleene, 
1938, pp. 150, 151) (My emphasis)  
  
The result, of course, was Kleene’s famous new concept of a “partially 
effective function”: 
 
… let us now call a function from any subset (proper or 
improper) of the 𝑛 -tuples of the natural numbers to the 
natural numbers a partial function. … For an 𝑛-tuple 𝑥1, … , 𝑥𝑛 
for which 𝜙  has a natural number as value, we say 𝜙  … is 
defined; for an 𝑛-tuple 𝑥1, … , 𝑥𝑛 for which 𝜙 has no natural 
number as value, we say 𝜙  … is undefined … The range of 
definition of a partial function is the set of the n-tuples 
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𝑥1, … , 𝑥𝑛  for which 𝜙(𝑥1, … , 𝑥𝑛)  is defined. When this 
consists of all 𝑛 -tuples, we have an ordinary (completely 
defined) number theoretic function; otherwise an incompletely 
defined function. When it is empty, we have the completely 
undefined function. (Kleene. Introduction to Meta-
mathematics. Pg. 325-6) 
 
In a quite curious “conceptual metamorphosis”, with Kleene’s new 
notion of partial (effective) function one could now have something 
rather surprising indeed. One could claim to have an “effective 
procedure” even though it was completely undefined, i.e., with the 
curious quirk of failing to deliver an answer to all possible intended 
questions! The constraint was not focused on effectivity anymore, but 
instead on the formalism itself (in Kleene’s case, general recursive 
formalism). Something could be an “effective procedure” even though 
it failed (completely) to be effective.11  
 
 
Aleatory Programing, Interruption, Conclusiveness and 
Finalization  
 
The central, teleological element present in the notion of 
algorithm was substituted by a purely extensional, formal criterion: 
grammaticality. But there is a second, all-important move present in 
Kleene’s new notion of an “effective procedure”: the crucial role of the 
notion of infinity. What about “non-terminating” procedures? Should 
we claim that they are not really algorithms, just because they don’t 
deliver an answer in any “finite number of steps”? Should we discard 
an algorithm, just because it happens not terminate? 
There would be a lot to say about this recourse to the (negative) 
notion of infinity within our characterization of an effective procedure. 
Let us now be content with commencing our discussion here the much 
simpler (positive) notion of finiteness. There is a curious ambiguity 
involving this term which is quite important for us. Finiteness can 
                                            
11 Carol Cleland makes a similar point in (Cleland, 2001). Her discussion there is somewhat 
hindered there because of her failure in carefully distinguishing empirical descriptions and 
normative criteria though. 
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mean interruption (say, of an empirical process), but it can also mean 
conclusiveness, a final accomplishment (say, of a task). 
The first concept is clearly empirical, the second is not. Thus one 
can say of an concrete process or event (such as raining, or even the 
workings of  computer), that it has been interrupted or ceased, that is, 
it is not unfolding in time any more. But such statement would not 
involve any implicature of accomplishment. One can interrupt the 
functioning of a desktop computer, say, simply by pulling off its plug, 
but this would of course have nothing to do with this machine having 
successfully accomplished any particular operation. It just means 
cessation of activities, that’s all. 
The situation can get even more confusing because there is a 
third, normative notion involved, that of finalization, i.e., the laying 
down of “purely formal criteria” for closure within a programming 
language. This prescriptive notion should not be confused, neither with 
the descriptive, empirical concept of interruption, cessation, nor with 
the teleological idea of accomplishment. Thus in most contemporary 
computer languages one finds a “normative counterpart” to the 
empirical notion of interruption of an operation, but this time 
employed, not to describe, but to prescribe, say, the transferal of 
control back to the main program or all the way to the operating 
system (C’s control statement “return” would be a good example of this 
directive). 
One can find this “prescriptive clauses” even in purely abstract 
formal languages. Let us take for example Martin Davis formal 
specification of a Turing Machine in his well-known book 
Computability and Unsolvability. Despite the rather misleading 
terminology of “machines”, one cannot but carefully distinguish 
between the formal language being introduced and any concrete 
(partial12) realization of it in a concrete apparatus (a concrete machine). 
In his Definition 1.8 Davis introduces a “purely formal” notion of 
closure:  
 
                                            
12 The idea of an “infinite tape” would of course mark of the purely abstract character of the 
proposal. 
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DEFINITION 1.8. An instantaneous description: 𝛼  is called 
terminal with respect to 𝑍 if for no 𝛽 do we have 𝛼 → 𝛽 (𝑍). 
[footnote of the author: Thus, the machine interprets the 
absence of an instruction as a “stop” order.]  (Davis, 1982, p. 
7) 
 
The purely formal (i.e., normative) character of the notion closure is 
even clearer in Post’s original formulation from 1936. There, instead of 
closure being left implicitly as mere absence of further instruction, the 
concept is explicitly listed as one of three main kinds of operations13 of 
his “machine”: 
 
(A) Perform operation 𝑂𝑖  [𝑂𝑖  =  (𝑎), (𝑏), (𝑐), 𝑜𝑟 (𝑑)]  and 
then follow direction 𝑗𝑖,  
(B) Perform operation (𝑒) and according as the answer is 𝑦𝑒𝑠 
or 𝑛𝑜 correspondingly follow direction 𝑗𝑖′ or 𝑗𝑖",  
(C) Stop. (Post, 2004, p. 290)  
 
Now, is this normative notion of closure the same as the teleological 
concept of accomplishment? Of course not! How could it be equivalent 
to the teleological notion if there is no teleology involved? We are 
dealing here with a purely grammatical determination: “𝛼  is [to be] 
called terminal with respect to 𝑍 if…”, no goal-orientation is mentioned 
or even considered as relevant. The notion of closure is of course is 
purely grammatical and does not involve any telos, any means to an 
end. 
One can better appreciate the difference between the teleological 
notion of accomplishment and the purely formal notion of closure 
(and, in general, between the teleological notion of algorithm and the 
grammatical notion of a program) if one considers the idea of “aleatory 
programing”. Let us use Turing’s formalism once more as our 
illustrative case. The “grammatical constraints” on the notion of a 
“Turing program” are very lenient: 
                                            
13 (a) is “marking the box”, (b) is “erasing the mark in the box”, (c) is “moving to the box on the 
right” and (d) is “moving to the box on the left”. (e) is “determining whether the box his is in, is 
or is not marked”. Thus, (a), (b) (c) and (d) would be a sort of “active capabilities” of the 
“machine”, and (e) would be a sort of “perceptive capability” of the “machine”. (Post, 2004, p. 
289) 
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DEFINITION 1.3. A Turing machine is a finite (nonempty) 
set of quadruples that contains no two quadruples whose first 
two symbols are the same. [Footnote of the author:  This last 
restriction is one of consistency. That is, it guarantees that no 
Turing machine will ever be confronted with two different 
instructions at the same time.] (Davis, 1982, p. 5)  
 
Considering such light grammatical constraints, it is not hard for us to 
imagine something like our “aleatory programming” taking place. Let 
us call the first two arguments of a Turing quadruple the “conditional 
arguments” (as opposed to the last two arguments, the active ones). Any 
old list of quadruples with the sole restriction of excluding repetition 
of the two initial, conditional arguments would do. We could just, say, 
shuffle a (consistent) set of quadruples and organize them in a 
sequence. The important point is that here we are obviously very far 
from any teleological considerations, any task being targeted. The 
whole idea was a purely random, aimless “programming”.  
Of course, regarding one of these final “aleatory program-texts”, 
one could still inquire whether the formal closure clause happened to 
be effective (or it belonged to the “trash-clauses”). But it is important to 
keep in mind here that we are in quite far any case from any notion of 
accomplishment, of a method of obtainment, thus from the notion of 
algorithm.  
 
 
Back to our “conjectures” 
 
We now have all the elements we need to begin facing our self-
imposed challenge: making sense of Wittgenstein’s strange idea of a 
semantical mutation, even when restricted to the highly confined 
context of recursive processes such as the periodical division 1 ÷ 3. As 
we have stressed above, one could readily agree that our program’s text 
remained exactly the same, before and after our having realized 
recurrence of the remainder and thus the cycle involved in that 
operation. How could it have changed if is hasn’t been rewritten? But 
should we go on to say the same about the original, teleological and 
intensional notion of algorithm? Should we say that our understanding 
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of that operation, qua an algorithm (as opposed a program’s text) 
remained exactly the same, before and after the realization of the cycle?  
As we’ve seen, nothing is more crucial regarding the (teleological) 
concept of algorithm than its goal. Thus, the centrality of its 
concluding clause: the clause that determines nothing less than our 
finally having accomplished task which justifies us calling by that 
name. In the words of Kleene above, the rules of instructions which 
allow us recognize 
 
… that now we have the answer before us and to read it off, or 
else that we do not yet have the answer before us… (Kleene, 
1995, p. 16) 
 
So let us consider the concluding clause of our algorithm for the 
obtainment of the third part of 1. In the case of that algorithm, the 
concluding criterion was clearly the final obtainment of a 0  as the 
remainder. The text of that embodied that clause, “ 𝑤ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑒 (𝑟𝑒𝑚 ≠
 0) 𝑑𝑜” obviously didn’t get transmuted just because of our realization 
of the cycle (“it just sits there on the page”, in Hehner’s words above). 
But what about our views on the effectiveness of that clause? Did that 
remained the same? It was stated there that we should conclude (a 
normative should!) our computation when we’ve found a digit “0” in 
the expansion of the remainder. But, after our realization of the cycle, 
what should we say about this conclusive clause? Does it even make 
sense now? How does one “look for a digit 0” in an expansion which 
cannot possibly contain anything else rather than 1’s? 
A direct consequence of realization of the cycle was that our very 
conclusive clause, “ 𝑤ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑒 (𝑅𝑒𝑚(𝑛)  ≠  0) 𝑑𝑜 ”, was really totally 
misconceived! How could one ever find a digit “ 0 ” in a cyclic 
expansion which does not include that digit in its cycle? Wittgenstein 
writes: 
Similarly, suppose someone were looking for a product whose 
middle digit was 4, and I said "Multiply 19 by 34".  
1 9 
 3 4 
7 6 
5 7  
6 4 6 
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What would it be like to look for a 5 in this result? I can 
imagine what it would be like to find a £5 note in a book, but 
can I imagine what it would be like to find a 5 in the result of 
this multiplication? I could rub out 4 and write 5; but this 
won’t do. You could object that I have written 5, but not 
found 5. (Wittgenstein, Wittgenstein's Lectures: Cambridge 
1932-1935, 1979, p. 183) 
 
As Wittgenstein emphasizes over and over again, mathematical rules are 
not descriptive, they are prescriptive, normative. We are not saying that 
someone, say, “little Jonny” won’t ever find a “0” in his expansion of 
the remainder of the division 1 ÷ 3 (and thus, quite proudly claim to 
have finally finished that operation!). What we are saying is that if any 
computing agent (either human or electronic) who “supposedly 
implements” that operation and ends up implementing that clause (and 
thus “halting”), the implementation would be immediately disqualified. 
Whatever happens to that agent, it couldn’t possibly qualify at the same 
time as having “implemented that operation” and having  
“implemented its concluding clause”. The two conditions are 
completely incompatible! This was our realization when we finally hit 
on the notion of cycle. 
 Another way of saying what we want to point out is that we 
have now comprehended that our conclusive clause 𝑤ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑒 (𝑅𝑒𝑚(𝑛)  ≠
 0) 𝑑𝑜 is completely innocuous within our program. One could even 
“operationally erase it”. We could substituted it, say, by a completely 
non-restrictive “1” (for “𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒”), as in “𝑤ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑒 (1) 𝑑𝑜”! The conditional 
clause would then simply be removed from our algorithm. It would not 
impose any condition whatsoever. But, based on our new mathematical 
insight, this new “program” would have (a normative “have”) to 
prescribe the same operation, even though its conclusive clause has 
been erased! This is what we meant by calling it innocuous.  
Of course, there is nothing in the notion of a program which 
demands any kind of effectiveness from it. A program is not something 
teleologically conceived. One can even have “random programming”, as 
above.  Its statements need merely to be grammatically correct, not 
effective in any way. One can have any amount of “trash-clauses” (i.e., 
innocuous ones) within programs, that would present no problem as 
far as its qualification as a program. It might not constitute a good 
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programming technique, but from a purely “extensional point of view”, 
it is ok. Trash clauses can still be part of the program-text. But should 
we also understand them as being part of our algorithm, even if they 
are completely ineffective? Can innocuous-clauses be part of a method 
of obtainment of something? 
One does not usually find extensive discussions in the literature 
on the distinction between trash versus effective clauses. An important 
exception is: 
 
Call a state 𝑋 of an algorithm 𝐴 reachable if 𝑋 occurs in some 
run of 𝐴. … We do not assume, however, that 𝒮(𝐴) [the states 
of the algorithm 𝐴] consists of reachable states only. … Often 
it is simpler than the set of reachable states and thus more 
convenient to deal with. (Gurevich, 2000, p. 83) 
 
Gurevich suggest disregarding the distinction between trash 
clauses and effective ones on account of convenience and simplicity. 
Should we accept his proposal based only on these flimsy grounds? 
Shouldn’t we consider Gurevich’s whole strategy of disregarding all 
intensional notions with no extensional counterpart as the very heart 
of the tendency were are opposing? As we said above, from the 
teleological point of view the acceptance of trash clauses amounts 
exactly to the blurring of the distinction of formal programs and 
teleological algorithms. In other words, according to our proposed 
version of Church’s thesis as advocating precisely such identification, 
the problem regarding these clauses amounts to nothing less then 
accepting or rejecting Church’s proposal! Trash clauses can belong to 
programs, but not to algorithms. This is the alternative construal we’ve 
been encouraging all along.  
 
 
The Semantical Mutation Thesis 
 
Let us pause for a while and review some of the important points 
we’ve achieved so far, trying to contrast the different approaches 
involved. Both classicists and intuitionists accept a completely abstract 
notion of an operation. The classicist construes these abstract entities 
directly as extensions, i.e., as an “abstract complete lists of partial 
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results”, the “final, correct results of an operation operated by no one 
at no particular time”.  
Intuitionists reject such construal as “abstract, platonic 
extravaganza”. They insist on the idea that all talk of infinity should 
always be construed through reference to an underlying method. On 
cannot talk about an infinite expansion, an “infinite list of answers”, 
except as a potential result of the application of a generating method. 
But one should not be deceived by concrete sounding terms such as, 
say, “construction”, “generating method”, etc.. The abstract character of 
this notion becomes clear, for example, when we consider the 
intuitionist’s notion of existence (the one expressed by the intuitionist’s 
existential quantifier, to be sure).  
Once one has a method (a “constructive operation”, say, for 
“generating” Pi’s decimal expansion) and any argument belonging to 
the appropriate argument-domain (the natural numbers in this case) 
one cannot but conclude that the application of that operation on that 
argument somehow “exists” in a purely “abstract sense”. Despite 
Dummett’s famous protests regarding Pi’s expansion: 
 
It seems that we ought to interpose between the platonist and 
the constructivist picture [a reference to Wittgenstein] an 
intermediate picture, say of objects springing into being in 
response to our probing. We do not make the objects but 
must accept them as we find them (this corresponds to the 
proof imposing itself on us); but they were not already there 
for our statements to be true of false of before we carried out 
the investigations which brought them into being” (Dummett, 
1978, p. 185)  
 
an intuitionist cannot but conclude that there does exist a digit 
corresponding, say, to the 1010
1010
 decimal place of Pi’s decimal 
expansion, even if its effective calculation would demand more seconds 
than the history of the universe since the Big Bang. We have a method 
and we have a correctly typed argument: intuitionistically we have to 
accept existence, some sort of “abstract existence”.   
 The important question for us here is this: whereof does this 
“abstract confidence” of intuitionists (and classicists) comes from? The 
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answer we’ve suggested above was: from a pretense ability of a little 
program-text such as:  
 
{ 
int divisor, dividend, quo, rem; 
dividend = 1; 
divisor = 3; 
quo = dividend ÷ divisor; 
rem = dividend – (quo × divisor); 
print (quo); 
while (rem ≠ 0) 
 { 
 quo = (10 × rem) ÷ divisor; 
 rem = (10 × rem) – (quo × divisor); 
 print (quo); 
 } 
} 
 
to “run ahead of us and fix the intended “extension of a function” 
much before anyone ever actually calculates this or that value” – even 
the 1010
1010𝑡ℎ
 decimal place of that expansion we’ve mentioned 
above. All this “abstract existence” is fully endorsed by the crucial 
intuitionist’s notion of possibility in principle.  
From our point of view, both the intuitionist’s and the 
classicist’s proposals are thus based on a postulation of a sort of 
“definitional power” a little text like that is supposed to have, an ability 
of singularly fix the entire intended expansion-list of the new 
operation, completely insulated from all future mathematical 
upheavals, of all novel mathematical revolutions. Thus according to 
those views, the identity of the defined-operation would be eternally 
secured by such syntactical constructions, such program-texts. In a sort 
of aristotelian vision, those documents would somehow possess a 
“potentiality property” incarnated in their very structure which would 
allow them to fix once and for all the very expansion intended in all 
future and even counterfactual occasions.  
Wittgenstein’s retort would be: shouldn’t one accept that new 
mathematical advances (such as our humble realization of the 
division’s cycle) may have some impact on our very discrimination of 
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what to classify as a (correct) implementation of the operations, quite 
independently of their original definitional texts? Should we really 
reject the idea that anyone of these new mathematical insights 
(recursion, infinity, etc.) could have any bearing on our judgment of 
implementation of those operations?  
Let us imagine a full class of youngsters in the beginning of a 
new academic year, say, struggling to learn decimal division, but still 
with no concept of recursion. And let us picture them now, towards the 
end of that semester, after having realized the crucial cyclic property. 
Should we accept that the new mathematical insight would have no 
impact on their ability as implementers of that operation? Of course, 
one could never say that the “correction-standards” have actually 
changed: if an old calculation is now recognized to contain a mistake, 
it will be considered as always having been wrong, no matter the date of 
the new mathematical advances. It didn’t “get to be wrong” or “became 
wrong”.  
Wittgenstein quite agrees with that: mathematical rules are 
atemporal, they don’t prescribe standards of correction only for this or 
that period of time. 
 
“The 100 apples in this box consist of 50 and 50” – here the 
non-temporal character of “consists” is important. For it 
doesn’t mean that now, or just for a time, they consist of 50 
and 50. (Wittgenstein, 1983, pp. 74, § 101)  
 
For him, mathematical advances do have a retroactive impact: they can 
overrule past attempts as errors. This is part of their “grammar”, as the 
philosopher would say. We don’t even have to evoke Wittgenstein for 
that point. Concerning proofs, instead of calculations, Dag Prawitz 
writes: 
 
If it turns out that we have made a mistake when trying to 
prove an assertion and that, in fact, what is asserted is false, 
then we say that we did not really have a proof. We only 
thought that we had a proof, but we did not really have one. 
This is how we use the notion of proof. (Prawitz.  Proofs 
Verifying Programs and Programs Producing Proofs: A 
Conceptual Analysis. Pg. 83) 
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But the important question here is this: even if we do accept the 
“grammatical point” above – as Wittgenstein surely does – should one 
advance one step ahead then and posit an “abstract entity” which 
would some how “incarnate the intended operation” once and forever, 
“eternally”? Should we follow the classicist’s metaphor and imagine a 
“marvelous complete list of answers”, a sort of “mathematical meter-of-
Paris, carefully preserved in some platonic ideal museum”? Or, 
alternatively, should we insist, as the intuitionists do, on introducing a 
“quasi-empirical force”, an “abstract trigger”, which would remain 
eternally operative and, once again, function as a sort of “abstract 
paradigm” for that operation? Do we need to posit the “list”, or else, 
the “force”? Could we not remain satisfied solely with the “grammatical 
note” above – mathematical advances have a retroactive impact – and 
let the rest go?  
 One could adopt Church’s intentional lambda notation in 
order to further elucidate Wittgenstein’s alternative view vis-à-vis the 
more traditional proposals. According to both intuitionists and 
classicists, we are dealing with one and the same abstract object, either 
before or after the “mathematical improvement”. As we have seen, for 
the classicists this abstract object would be an extensional construed 
entity, a Set: 
{(𝑛, 𝑞𝑛) ∶ (1 ÷ 3)(𝑛) =  𝑞𝑛} 
 
whereas for an intuitionist the enduring equally abstract object would 
be an intentionally construed entity, a Method of obtainment: 
[𝜆𝑛 ∶ ℕ .  (1 ÷ 3)(𝑛)] 
 
With the intentional notion at our disposal, one could represent 
Wittgenstein’s semantical mutation quite graphically by saying that, 
contrary to the more familiar proposals, in Wittgenstein’s construal of 
the mathematical episode, one has a different concept of division, 
before and after the mathematical improvement. Before the advance, 
one would equate the concept of the division with whatever satisfied 
the algorithm. Thus, employing Church’s intentional lambda notion, 
we could represent that concept as: 
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[𝜆𝑒𝑝 ∶ 𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑝 .  𝑆𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝐴𝑙𝑔𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑚(𝑒𝑝)] 
 
After the proof, according to Wittgenstein, a number of new 
definitional notes (new Merkmale) were added to the original construal 
of that operation, new definitional criteria for its implementation, thus 
completely revamping the old notion into a quite novel conception of 
that simple operation. Once again we could represent this new concept 
as: 
 
[𝜆𝑒𝑝 ∶ 𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑝 .  𝑆𝑎𝑡 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝐴𝑙𝑔𝑡ℎ𝑚(𝑒𝑝) ∧ 𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑠(𝑒𝑝)
∧ 𝑁𝑜𝑛𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠(𝑤𝑝) ∧ … ] 
 
We could then finally fulfill our self-imposed task of explaining 
just what conceptual change Wittgenstein had in mind in a conjecture-
settling (in a situation like that of the division 1 ÷ 3 ) by directly 
“drawing” the intended conceptual mutation, say, as: 
 
[𝜆𝑒𝑝 ∶ 𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑝 .  𝑆𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝐴𝑙𝑔𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑚(𝑒𝑝)] 
Before the 
mutation 
 
 
 
 
[𝜆𝑒𝑝 ∶ 𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑝.  𝑆𝑎𝑡 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝐴𝑙𝑔𝑡ℎ𝑚(𝑒𝑝) ∧ 𝑹𝒆𝒄𝒖𝒓𝒔(𝒆𝒑)
∧ 𝑵𝒐𝒏𝑻𝒆𝒓𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒔(𝒘𝒑) ∧ … ] 
 
After the 
mutation 
As we pointed out above, even our views on the text of the 
original definition (the program) have changed. The very conclusive 
clause of the original definition of that operation was discarded as 
misconceived; it was necessarily inapplicable. We have thus a 
completely new intentional stance towards that operation, an 
intentional view which according to Wittgenstein should never be 
equated to the original conceptions. 
 
 And the discovery of the periodicity is really the 
construction of a new sign and a new calculus. For it is 
misleading to say that this discovery consists in our having 
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noticed that the first remainder is equal to the dividend. For if 
we had asked someone unacquainted with periodic division: 
“Is the first remainder in this division equal to the dividend?”, 
of course he would have answered “Yes”; so he would have 
noticed this. But in noticing it he wouldn’t have had to notice 
the periodicity; that is, in noticing it he would not have 
discovered the calculus with the signs 𝑎 ÷ 𝑏 =  𝑐 . 
(Wittgenstein, 2005, p. 451) 
 
 
Bibliography 
 
Bernays, P. (1986). Commments on Remarks on the Foundations of 
Mathematics. In S. Shanker, Ludwig Wittgenstein: Critical Assessments 
(pp. 165-182). London: Routledge. 
Bishop, E. (1986). Selected Papers. Philadelphia: World Scientific. 
Cleland, C. (2001). Recipes, Algorithms, and Programs. Minds and 
Machines , 11, pp. 219-237. 
Davis, M. (1982). Computability and Unsolvability. New York: Dover. 
Diamond, C. (1991). The Realistic Spirit. Cambridge: The Mit Press. 
Dummett, M. (1977). Elements of Intuitionism. Oxford: Claredon. 
Dummett, M. (1978). Truth and Other Enigmas. Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press. 
Frascolla, P. (2004). Wittgenstein on Mathematical Proof. In A. Coliva, 
& E. Picardi, Wittgenstein Today (pp. 167-184). Padova: Poligrafo. 
GERRARD, S. (1991). Wittgenstein's Philosophies of mathematics. 
Synthese , 87, pp. 125-142. 
GLOCK, H.-J. (1996). A Wittgenstein Dictionary. London: Wiley-
Blackwell. 
GUREVICH, Y. (2000, July). Sequential Abstract-State Machines 
Capture Sequential Algorithms. ACM Transactions on Computational 
Logic , 1 (1), pp. 77-111. 
Gurevich, Y., & Deschowitz, N. (2008). A Natural Aximatization of 
Computability and a Proof of Church's Thesis. Bulletin of Symbolic 
Logic , 14 (3), pp. 299-350. 
HILBERT, D., & Ackermann, W. (1928). Grundzüge der Theoretischen 
Logik (1st ed.). Berlin: Springer. 
KLEENE, S. (1938). Notation for Ordinal Numbers. Journal of 
Symbolic Logic , 3 (4), pp. 150-5. 
André Porto 
 
 
75                            
 
KLEENE, S. (1995). Turing's Analysis of Computability, and Major 
Applications of it. In R. Herken, The Universal Turing Machine: A 
Half-Century Survey. Wien: Springer-Verlag. 
Mac Lane, S. (1986). Mathematics: Form and Function. New York: 
Springer-Verlag. 
MARION, M., & Okada, M. (2012). Wittgenstein et le lien entre la 
signification d’un énoncé mathématique et sa preuve. Philosophiques , 
39 (1), pp. 101-124. 
MARTIN-LÖF, P. (1991). A Path from Logic to Metaphysics. In Atti 
del Congresso Nouvi della logica e della filosofia della scienza (pp. 141-
149). Bologna: Clueb. 
(1984). Intuitionistic Type Theory. Naples: Bibliopolis. 
PANJVANI, C. (2006). Wittgenstein and Strong Mathematical 
Verifcationism. The Philosophical Quartely , 56 (224), pp. 406-425. 
PETER, R. (1959). Rekursivität und Konstructivität. In A. Heyting, 
Constructivity in Mathematics. Amsterdam: North-Holland. 
PORTO, A. (2013). Rule Following and Functions. O que nos faz 
pensar , 33, pp. 63-109. 
POST, E. (2004). Finite Combinatory Processes. Formulation I. In M. 
Davis, The Undecidable: Basic Papers on Undecidable Propositions, 
Unsolvable Problems and Computable Functions (pp. 288-291). 
Mineola: Dover Publications. 
PRAWITZ, D. (1977, April). The conflict between Classical and 
Intuitionistic Logic. Theoria , 43, pp. 2-40. 
PUTNAM, H. (2007). Wittgenstein and the Real Numbers. In A. Crary, 
Wittgenstein and the Moral Life Essays in Honor of Cora Diamond 
(pp. 235-250). Cambridge: MIT. 
Säätelä, S. (2011). From Logical Method to ‘Messing About’: 
Wittgenstein on ‘Open Problems’ in Mathematics. In M. McGinn, & 
O. Kuusela, The Oxford Hanbook on Wittgenstein (pp. 162-182). 
Oxford: Oxford. 
Schroeder, S. (2012). Conjecture, Proof, and Sense, in Wittgenstein’s 
Philosophy of Mathematics. In C. Jäger , & W. Löffler, Epistemology: 
Contexts, Values, Disagreement. Proceedings of the 34th International 
Ludwig Wittgenstein Symposium in Kirchberg (pp. 459-471). Frankfurt: 
Ontos. 
Dossiê Wittgenstein, Dissertatio - Volume Suplementar 01 | UFPel [2015]                                                   
 
76 
 
SHANKER, S. (1987). Wittgenstein and the Turning-point in the 
Philosophy of Mathematics. London: Croom Helm. 
Skolem, T. (1952). Sobre la Naturaleza del Razonamento Matematico. 
Gazeta Matematica , 4, pp. 113-124. 
Van Heijenoort, J. (1967). From Frege to Gödel: a source book in 
Mathematical Logic, 1879-1931. Cambridge: Harvard. 
WITTGENSTEIN, L. (1976). Lectures on the Foundations of 
Mathematics, Cambridge, 1939. Chicago: The University of Chicago 
Press. 
(1975). Philosophical Remarks. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 
(1983). Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics. Cambridge: Mit. 
(2005). The Big Typescript. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 
(1979). Wittgenstein's Lectures: Cambridge 1932-1935. Totowa: 
Rowman & Littlefield. 
(1979). Wittgenstein's Lectures: Cambridge 1932-1935. Totowa: 
Rowman & Littlefield. 
WRIGHT, C. (1980). Wittgenstein on the Foundations of Mathematics. 
Cambridge: Harvard. 
 
 
